The Common Good

"According to the World Bank, levels of income inequality in China and the USA are about the same"

What's become of the common good? That's a question the advocates of western-style liberal democracies need to answer. Why? Well, for starters, Covid-19 has given us the chance to observe the different ways nations tackle a crisis, and autocratic China came out on top. In the third quarter, China's GDP grew by 4.9 per cent with a notable surge in industrial production. The country is up and running. Meanwhile, in much of the West, the pandemic rages unabated. 

Did the West's response falter because of culture, allied to political jockeying? Has democracy fallen flat on its face? Add to that long-term issues, such as left-behind communities filled with resentment as the world globalised. To them, a hi-jacked democracy panders to elites and the wealthy. 

Does all this mean the autocracies have won? My intuition tells me, rushing to such a conclusion is misguided. As always, a nuanced, complicated, picture not open to straightforward analysis emerges.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, everyone assumed the debate was over. The verdict formed that the world was moving towards the spread of liberal democracies and free markets. As a consequence of the failure of the communist experiment, the USA stood as the world's only superpower. Did this vindicate the liberal democratic model as supreme? Many believed yes. Francis Fukuyama captured the zeitgeist as he trumpeted the 'End of History'.

In Washington, this state of affairs echoed a long-standing conviction that America has a divinely inspired mission to make the world safe. A deep seam of evangelising runs through the culture: Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, when challenged on lavish pay replied he was "doing God's work."

So, the West assumed they'd triumphed. And feeling empowered, led by the USA, they set about promoting a neoliberal version of globalisation as they encouraged democracy. When facing resistance, they sanctioned, threatened and intervened, sometimes, with terrible outcomes.

But, if you look at the record, the West's support of democracy comes somewhat framed by strategic and economic interests. Contrast the position on Saudi Arabia to that of China. Pushing a democratic agenda, and human rights, doesn't appear to infuse Western politicians when national interests infringe. Odd that. Noam Chomsky cited this attitude as 'schizophrenia'.

But far from being an all-embracing world view, a school of thought now portrays this 'winning' narrative as parochial. As the deliberations failed to recognise each countries unique history, how can it hold sway? In short, blinded by conceit, the majority of the Western intelligentsia didn't have the tools to comprehend events. 

Within academic circles, a fierce debate rages: "Have the scholars failed to interpret events correctly?". For many, the discourse holds that Fukuyama's chronicle of events has deep flaws, is shallow and unbalanced. Even Fukuyama has rolled back on his seminal work, admitting he missed the rise of China and other factors.

As a side issue, this discussion is exposing so-called experts as intellectual eunuchs, devoid of free-thinking. These people are beholden to the agenda of their institutions. Instead of roaming free over vast areas of knowledge to interpret the world, most are hired-guns, who craft messages as 'product'. Think-tanks, governments and intelligence agencies fund this 'product' expecting a specific outcome. Then the media run this 'product' as the accepted version of events. 

By now, you are asking, beyond the Covid-19 response, where is the evidence that the democratic system falters?

Exhibit One: with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experimented with a western-style free-market model and elections. As it turned out, this approach empowered an autocratic regime with oligarchs soon running the show. 

Exhibit Two: ousting Saddam Hussein did not bring freedom and calm to Iraq. Instead, the result was instability, millions dead, with a brutal civil war that rumbles on. Yes, Saddam ran a morally indefensible regime — no one denies that. Has what came next proved any better? The region is looking worse than ever.

Exhibit Three: the Arab spring was to herald a new democratic era in the Middle East. In Egypt, once the despot fell, radicals seized the democratic process to install a regime of fundamentalists. Back to square one.

Exhibit Four: we have economic data from the IMF and the Democracy Index of The Economist. Between 2012 and 2016, Turkmenistan, Ethiopia, China, Mongolia, Ireland, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Laos, Panama and Georgia enjoyed the fastest economic growth. Only Ireland scores well in democracy. Moreover, South Korea made its best economic advances while under a military dictatorship.

Add to that research by leading economist Paul Collier. He concludes that democracy can destabilise a country in the early stages of its economic development, in turn, stunting progress. Likewise, once a nation attains economic maturity, democracy can bring stability although the net effect of democracy may be ambiguous.

Then I ask how Cuba can have better child mortality rates than the USA? How come Hong Kong’s streets are far safer than those in the UK? What’s interesting is that for life expectancy world-wide, US is ranked 46th, while undemocratic Hong Kong comes first. Maybe that because the USA is rated 97th for access to quality health care and 91st on basic education.

The fact is, across a host of parameters, democracy doesn't always guarantee the best outcomes for the majority of people. So, the people who claim the supremacy of that model must face this uncomfortable set of facts.

According to the World Bank, levels of income inequality in China and the USA are about the same. But, consider this: in China, both rich and poor alike realised income gains, while since the 1970s in the USA the growth has benefited the top ten per cent only. 

Of course, for decades, the 'experts' claimed China couldn't succeed because it wasn't democratic. That analysis proved wrong.

In the early 1980s, across the border from Hong Kong, the special economic zone of Shenzhen gathered pace. This growth proved you could triumph economically without liberal democracy.

It's interesting to note that China, despite its evident success, does not force its system on other countries. In Africa, China is conducting a programme of 'pragmatic imperialism' that involves investment, development and the taking of resources. Yes, the arrangement is transactional. China benefits, but, they don't tell the host how to live or run their country.

As regard Covid-19, whereas President Trump fumbled about, China acted decisively. In an incredible display of capacity and order, the authorities tested the 11 million Wuhan residents for the virus within ten days. The verdict seems clear: authoritarianism is superior to liberal democracy when fast mobilisation drives success.

But again, this conclusion is simplistic and even misleading. Note that democratic places, such as South Korea and New Zealand, handled the pandemic well. Their systems did not block the ability to put in place virus containment measures.  

Could it be that America's current troubles do not reflect a universal failure of democracy? Instead, are we witnessing an unbalanced order that favours a few? The lesson I draw from America's upheaval is that even a mature democracy must be continuously maintained to function. There is no 'end of history'.

Likewise, never forget the catalyst for China's economic growth. Deng Xiaoping injected elements of accountability, competition, and limits on power. This hybrid political system, married to a firm commitment to markets, took China from poverty to middle-income status.

Besides, the stated institutional advantages of China's top-down rule are both a strength and a weakness. Owing to its origins the Communist Party of China implements policies in the manner of ‘campaigns’. That means the entire bureaucracy and society come together to achieve a given goal.

Then when pressured to do whatever it takes to achieve targets, officials may use extreme measures triggering new problems down the road. Significant and quick results rarely come without costs. For example, displacing people for urban expansion led to unrest and bitterness. 

Nonetheless, these ‘campaigns’ deliver impressive results. Xi's poverty-fighting initiative  lifted 93 million rural residents out of poverty in seven years. Let's be clear; the West would still be debating the issue after seven years, without resolution, never mind any action.

Here's the thing, the idea that we can choose only between an American-style democracy and a Chinese-style autocracy is false. Indeed when the real aim of governance is to ensure pluralism with stability – countries must find their own path.

Perhaps the current era, rather than being the end of democracy, is a period of correction. Few would disagree, that the failure of free-market capitalism and globalisation to serve everyone, is causing deep resentment. The West needs to recognise this. It can't continue working with entrenched political ideologies that are tone-deaf to public sentiment. 

Where do we go from here? Looking back through history, every great civilisation rises to power, reaches a peak, and then declines. This is Oswald Spenglar's thesis. Yet, I doubt we are there: democracy won't collapse, nor will the liberal democratic model fade. But, it will evolve. After all, the USA, in particular,  has a remarkable ability to reinvent itself — the 'new dawn' at each iteration. 

Meanwhile, China is advancing and finding its way. The West would be foolhardy in the extreme to think it can halt or hold back that process to secure its strategic interests.

So, to answer the question: "What's become of the common good?" the West needs to acknowledge its manifest failings. Then bring some balance by addressing broader issues in their societies. In the meantime, raging and flailing against China won't help, especially when Beijing is advancing the stock of millions of people.

Douglas Carswell asserts "The elites frequently get things wrong" in 'The End of Politics and the Birth of iDemocracy'. He observed, "they endlessly seek to govern by design a world that is best organised spontaneously from below". Indeed, therefore, the best outcomes for the 'common good' rest in each system learning from the other, to incorporate advantages and moderate their failings. Engagement and cooperation is the only viable way forward.