While President Xi Jinping gets all the headlines, there is a compelling argument that the hidden thought-leader of China is a shy former academic. Quiet and reflective, he exercises considerable influence without media fanfare.
Wang Huning, a professor at the age of 30, first came to public attention in 1993. That year he led a team to win an international debating competition held in Singapore. He defeated a Taiwanese team arguing that human nature is inherently evil.
He foreshadowed, "While Western modern civilisation can bring material prosperity, it doesn't necessarily lead to improvement in character." As part of his position, Wang marvelled at the material prosperity of the West while asserting it is morally bankrupt due to a lack of values and societal cohesion. Moreover, like other socialist thinkers before him, he opined that these conditions would erode and weaken the West's standing over time.
This impressed Chinese leaders, who snatched Wang from relative obscurity to help shape government policy. He then rose with speed to become a member of the Politburo, holding his seat under three Presidents. A remarkable achievement.
Now seen as China's ideological Tsar, Wang is low-profile and is viewed as a liberal influence. But, those 'liberal' credentials are debatable. Instead, Wang appears to be the driving force to reset the values of Chinese society with a return to traditional values.
That desire for change appears, in part, driven by Wang's observations about where the West went wrong. He lays out those thoughts in a seminal 1991 book 'America versus America' after spending the late 1980s in the U.S.
Like President Xi, Wang has reportedly grown repulsed by the direction of Chinese society; the over-commercialisation, corruption, the wealth gap, a loss of values, the break up of the family unit, while drugs and prostitution proliferated.
Wang's rendering of the U.S. is a fascinating read as you see America through his eyes. The book is at once detailed, twee, profound and contradictory. In parts, the text reads like a travelogue, then an exposition, before moving to critique.
A few of his sweeping conclusions, shaped by the 1980s, now look dated and don't stand up. Other deductions give Wang the air of a prophet. He identifies the contradictions at the core of American society — a super-rich country full of poor people with a flawed democracy. Finally, he concludes that these paradoxes will bring a 'constant crisis' to the country.
He asks questions about the merits of democracy, citing that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea all developed advanced economies without Western-styled democracy.
Remarkably, although he may not have realised it at the time, Wang foresaw a possible future for China because many of the same challenges he identifies in the U.S. have since hit home.
'America versus America' is an impressive work because Wang manages to take in the whole breadth of American society. He covers history, politics, industry, work ethics, sex, family life and food. The list goes on. Plus, with an eye for detail, not much escapes his attention. He even gives us the dimensions of a voting slip in a local election.
He perceives that four 'Cs' dominate American culture; cars, computers, calls (telephones everywhere) and credit cards. Yet, throughout, you can sense his awe, admiration and fascination with America achievements. He marvels that he can get pizza delivered to his front door, the modern feel of the cities and efficient transport system. But, remember, this is the 1980s.
On encountering volunteer workers, Wang is baffled. He observes that these dedicated people work without pay and are compensated only by earning social recognition and finding meaning by helping others. Likewise, he admires the service culture, noting that the staff in travel agents went beyond their assigned roles to help him.
He decides that Americans are pragmatic, focused people who rely on their knowledge to get on. Next, he suggests that family connections play a lesser role in society. Unfortunately, this assertion is somewhat off the mark.
Likewise, he states the American approach to management is rigid and strict, whereas the Chinese style is more flexible. That's not an assessment many would recognise as accurate.
He is on more solid ground when he talks of U.S. national traits of honour, strength, and outspokenness. In the same vein, he observes that parents love their children, although he adds kids are encouraged to leave home and make their way in the world early.
Throughout, Wang asks, 'Why is America a success?'. He's keen to see what lessons China can learn. Then he expresses disappointment at the unaddressed poverty, the considerable wealth gap, homeless people and evident social injustice.
Further, seeing a crisis of trust arising in the younger generation, he seeks to comprehend the outcome. Observing that Americans hold themselves superior to others, Wang nonetheless decides they have social democracy, not economic democracy.
Wong gradually comes to see America as an 'atomised' society; the individual dominates the group. He concludes this led to the break up of the family as cohesiveness eroded. Further, the constant conflict between equality and freedom is unresolved. He argues that if you have true individual freedom, then inequality must arise. On the reverse side, attempts to bring equality then trample on freedoms.
Without a unifying stance, because individual freedoms triumph, inequality is rampant, crime is out of control, and the political process produces parties focused on winning elections instead of fixing problems.
For Wang, only two political parties matter; the Democrats and the Republicans. Moreover, he sees that people move between these parties at ease. From this, Wang deduces neither party has a fixed systematic theory. That's an observation many would recognise, summed up by "No matter who you vote for, the outcome is the same."
Wang attends party conferences, meets senators and officials, gaining access to top decision-makers. But, unfortunately, he's less than impressed; the parties disregard campaign promises and once elected, it's too late for citizens to change things.
He sums up the political situation, "you can't say it's undemocratic, and you can't say it's democratic because American elections are not fully contested."
Wang follows the campaign for the White House, taking particular interest in how the transition of power proceeds. Given the upheavals that China suffered through leadership changes, he is keen to understand the mechanisms.
"It is unthinkable that any outgoing president would not leave the White House", he affirms. But, of course, it's too much to conclude that Wang prophesied the actions of Trump. Yet, he grasps that at such times, American democracy hangs by a thread.
Wang expresses shock at the sight of the poor homeless living in the street, something he never envisaged in America. A whole chapter covers his encounters and engagements with beggars, who reveal to him another side of the American dream. For him, this is the dark underbelly not well known or shared with the world.
It is possible to see that Wang hoped to find valuable insights in America that may help steer developments in China. Yet, what Wang saw in America was China's potential future, and that unsettled him. If China continued on a track towards nihilistic individualism typified by what we now may call 'woke culture, he foresaw immense risks.
By 1989, Wang was back in China as unrest took hold and gathered pace towards the Tiananmen protests. Setting his mind on how to govern China, he reflects on what he's seen in America. This deliberation led him to a theory of socialism with Confucian values centred on robust leadership.
Then by chance, following 1989, as the communist party scrambled for a new political model, Wang had a nascent ideological template ready for them.
These days China has many of the same problems America faces, including falling fertility rates, disengaged youth, a massive rich/poor gap, the power of tech giants, a gig economy, and stalled social mobility. So does Wang fear that China will 'atomise' much as happened in America and elsewhere in the West? Looks like it.
Hence the 'common prosperity' drive that seeks to carry the whole country forward at once. This idea is not new. Similar sentiments have existed since 1949, except never fleshed out and given such purpose.
As part of the current process, the all-powerful tech companies face constraints. Besides, the excesses of the gauche super-rich are frowned upon, and the feminisation of men deplored.
Other manifestations of the 'common prosperity' drive include restricting the amount of homework kids get, limiting online gaming activity and arresting a prominent pianist for visiting a prostitute. In addition, pop stars and leading actors are now facing scrutiny for their behaviour.
In many ways, China is a victim of its own success. First, rapid economic growth brought forth a distinct wealthy city-based middle-class. Second, with that came youth culture and all the aspirations that being middle-class evokes.
Meanwhile, the rural areas have benefitted, but growth is less spectacular and patchy. Thus, recognising that such disparities may give rise to social unrest, the show-offs must be curtailed.
Wang envisages a return to ancient Chinese core values, emphasising the roles and duties of the ruler, subjects, and the importance of family. Moreover, with moderation in everything, egos are held in check, while the servant-leader model predominates and soft power prevails.
His ‘neo-authoritarianism’ doctrine holds that political stability is fundamental for economic development, and that democracy and individual rights should come later when the time is appropriate.
Yet, whether Xi and Wang can successfully steer China through its current challenges is impossible to say. With significant societal forces at play, many variables allied to people's aspirations, it will take considerable effort and time to realign the whole of China, if that is even possible.
Within living memory, another Chinese leader had a fixation with changing the whole of Chinese society. Mao's cultural revolution soon spun out of control, with disastrous consequences leaving death, chaos, and China weakened. Wang will undoubtedly have that era at the back of his mind as he gently adjusts the levers of control.
Many commentators feel that Wang Huning is arguably the single most influential public intellectual alive today. If he can pull off this next transformation of China, history will acknowledge him as one of the most influential public figures ever.
Wang Huning, a professor at the age of 30, first came to public attention in 1993. That year he led a team to win an international debating competition held in Singapore. He defeated a Taiwanese team arguing that human nature is inherently evil.
He foreshadowed, "While Western modern civilisation can bring material prosperity, it doesn't necessarily lead to improvement in character." As part of his position, Wang marvelled at the material prosperity of the West while asserting it is morally bankrupt due to a lack of values and societal cohesion. Moreover, like other socialist thinkers before him, he opined that these conditions would erode and weaken the West's standing over time.
This impressed Chinese leaders, who snatched Wang from relative obscurity to help shape government policy. He then rose with speed to become a member of the Politburo, holding his seat under three Presidents. A remarkable achievement.
Now seen as China's ideological Tsar, Wang is low-profile and is viewed as a liberal influence. But, those 'liberal' credentials are debatable. Instead, Wang appears to be the driving force to reset the values of Chinese society with a return to traditional values.
That desire for change appears, in part, driven by Wang's observations about where the West went wrong. He lays out those thoughts in a seminal 1991 book 'America versus America' after spending the late 1980s in the U.S.
Like President Xi, Wang has reportedly grown repulsed by the direction of Chinese society; the over-commercialisation, corruption, the wealth gap, a loss of values, the break up of the family unit, while drugs and prostitution proliferated.
Wang's rendering of the U.S. is a fascinating read as you see America through his eyes. The book is at once detailed, twee, profound and contradictory. In parts, the text reads like a travelogue, then an exposition, before moving to critique.
A few of his sweeping conclusions, shaped by the 1980s, now look dated and don't stand up. Other deductions give Wang the air of a prophet. He identifies the contradictions at the core of American society — a super-rich country full of poor people with a flawed democracy. Finally, he concludes that these paradoxes will bring a 'constant crisis' to the country.
He asks questions about the merits of democracy, citing that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea all developed advanced economies without Western-styled democracy.
Remarkably, although he may not have realised it at the time, Wang foresaw a possible future for China because many of the same challenges he identifies in the U.S. have since hit home.
'America versus America' is an impressive work because Wang manages to take in the whole breadth of American society. He covers history, politics, industry, work ethics, sex, family life and food. The list goes on. Plus, with an eye for detail, not much escapes his attention. He even gives us the dimensions of a voting slip in a local election.
He perceives that four 'Cs' dominate American culture; cars, computers, calls (telephones everywhere) and credit cards. Yet, throughout, you can sense his awe, admiration and fascination with America achievements. He marvels that he can get pizza delivered to his front door, the modern feel of the cities and efficient transport system. But, remember, this is the 1980s.
On encountering volunteer workers, Wang is baffled. He observes that these dedicated people work without pay and are compensated only by earning social recognition and finding meaning by helping others. Likewise, he admires the service culture, noting that the staff in travel agents went beyond their assigned roles to help him.
He decides that Americans are pragmatic, focused people who rely on their knowledge to get on. Next, he suggests that family connections play a lesser role in society. Unfortunately, this assertion is somewhat off the mark.
Likewise, he states the American approach to management is rigid and strict, whereas the Chinese style is more flexible. That's not an assessment many would recognise as accurate.
He is on more solid ground when he talks of U.S. national traits of honour, strength, and outspokenness. In the same vein, he observes that parents love their children, although he adds kids are encouraged to leave home and make their way in the world early.
Throughout, Wang asks, 'Why is America a success?'. He's keen to see what lessons China can learn. Then he expresses disappointment at the unaddressed poverty, the considerable wealth gap, homeless people and evident social injustice.
Further, seeing a crisis of trust arising in the younger generation, he seeks to comprehend the outcome. Observing that Americans hold themselves superior to others, Wang nonetheless decides they have social democracy, not economic democracy.
Wong gradually comes to see America as an 'atomised' society; the individual dominates the group. He concludes this led to the break up of the family as cohesiveness eroded. Further, the constant conflict between equality and freedom is unresolved. He argues that if you have true individual freedom, then inequality must arise. On the reverse side, attempts to bring equality then trample on freedoms.
Without a unifying stance, because individual freedoms triumph, inequality is rampant, crime is out of control, and the political process produces parties focused on winning elections instead of fixing problems.
For Wang, only two political parties matter; the Democrats and the Republicans. Moreover, he sees that people move between these parties at ease. From this, Wang deduces neither party has a fixed systematic theory. That's an observation many would recognise, summed up by "No matter who you vote for, the outcome is the same."
Wang attends party conferences, meets senators and officials, gaining access to top decision-makers. But, unfortunately, he's less than impressed; the parties disregard campaign promises and once elected, it's too late for citizens to change things.
He sums up the political situation, "you can't say it's undemocratic, and you can't say it's democratic because American elections are not fully contested."
Wang follows the campaign for the White House, taking particular interest in how the transition of power proceeds. Given the upheavals that China suffered through leadership changes, he is keen to understand the mechanisms.
"It is unthinkable that any outgoing president would not leave the White House", he affirms. But, of course, it's too much to conclude that Wang prophesied the actions of Trump. Yet, he grasps that at such times, American democracy hangs by a thread.
Wang expresses shock at the sight of the poor homeless living in the street, something he never envisaged in America. A whole chapter covers his encounters and engagements with beggars, who reveal to him another side of the American dream. For him, this is the dark underbelly not well known or shared with the world.
It is possible to see that Wang hoped to find valuable insights in America that may help steer developments in China. Yet, what Wang saw in America was China's potential future, and that unsettled him. If China continued on a track towards nihilistic individualism typified by what we now may call 'woke culture, he foresaw immense risks.
By 1989, Wang was back in China as unrest took hold and gathered pace towards the Tiananmen protests. Setting his mind on how to govern China, he reflects on what he's seen in America. This deliberation led him to a theory of socialism with Confucian values centred on robust leadership.
Then by chance, following 1989, as the communist party scrambled for a new political model, Wang had a nascent ideological template ready for them.
These days China has many of the same problems America faces, including falling fertility rates, disengaged youth, a massive rich/poor gap, the power of tech giants, a gig economy, and stalled social mobility. So does Wang fear that China will 'atomise' much as happened in America and elsewhere in the West? Looks like it.
Hence the 'common prosperity' drive that seeks to carry the whole country forward at once. This idea is not new. Similar sentiments have existed since 1949, except never fleshed out and given such purpose.
As part of the current process, the all-powerful tech companies face constraints. Besides, the excesses of the gauche super-rich are frowned upon, and the feminisation of men deplored.
Other manifestations of the 'common prosperity' drive include restricting the amount of homework kids get, limiting online gaming activity and arresting a prominent pianist for visiting a prostitute. In addition, pop stars and leading actors are now facing scrutiny for their behaviour.
In many ways, China is a victim of its own success. First, rapid economic growth brought forth a distinct wealthy city-based middle-class. Second, with that came youth culture and all the aspirations that being middle-class evokes.
Meanwhile, the rural areas have benefitted, but growth is less spectacular and patchy. Thus, recognising that such disparities may give rise to social unrest, the show-offs must be curtailed.
Wang envisages a return to ancient Chinese core values, emphasising the roles and duties of the ruler, subjects, and the importance of family. Moreover, with moderation in everything, egos are held in check, while the servant-leader model predominates and soft power prevails.
His ‘neo-authoritarianism’ doctrine holds that political stability is fundamental for economic development, and that democracy and individual rights should come later when the time is appropriate.
Yet, whether Xi and Wang can successfully steer China through its current challenges is impossible to say. With significant societal forces at play, many variables allied to people's aspirations, it will take considerable effort and time to realign the whole of China, if that is even possible.
Within living memory, another Chinese leader had a fixation with changing the whole of Chinese society. Mao's cultural revolution soon spun out of control, with disastrous consequences leaving death, chaos, and China weakened. Wang will undoubtedly have that era at the back of his mind as he gently adjusts the levers of control.
Many commentators feel that Wang Huning is arguably the single most influential public intellectual alive today. If he can pull off this next transformation of China, history will acknowledge him as one of the most influential public figures ever.
October 2021
Copyright © 2015