Three Wise Men from the West
Sir James Crane
In the aftermath of October 1977, London continued to fret about the Hong Kong Police. In their view, things were far from stable. Governor MacLehose (above) was also looking for reforms. In January 1978 he made a extraordinary admission. At a Chamber of Commerce dinner, he spoke of “weaknesses in the chain of communication and of command.” Such open criticism was unheard of in colonial circles.
Its decided an advisory team from the UK will visit Hong Kong. They are immediately dubbed the ‘Three Wise Men’. The team led by Inspector of Constabulary, Mr J.W.D. Crane, arrives on January 17 1978. He's supported by two chief superintendents.
The team is to advise on:
Crane sought to soften the blow. He stated in public “we are here to assist the force in finding ways and means to meet their current problems.” Anyone who understands the politics will recognise that this is window dressing. Something has gone wrong, and the Crane team is in Hong Kong to find out why.
Crane's work proves harder thanks to the actions of the ICAC. With the situation volatile, sentiments are incensed on all sides. Even so, the ICAC announces an ID parade for officers detained for the Yaumati fruit market case. These officers have been on bail a year, and the timing adds fuel to the fire. Officers are not afforded the opportunity to get legal advice. Sources have suggested a repeat of 1977 was only averted by calmer heads.
Crane and his team set about their work including interviewing officers of all ranks. Then reports emerged that Slevin is receiving daily updates on who and what gets said to the team. Further, rank and file officers have interviews in the presence of their commanders. None of which is conducive to the fact-finding Crane must undertake. Of course, officers are reluctant to voice opinions fearful of retribution later. The very creditability of the process is now in doubt.
Men who wish to give evidence to the team must apply through the Commissioner. This leaks out to the media causing something of an adverse reaction. Many fear a whitewash by Crane.
Yet, the team came forward with welcome suggestions. The role of the JPOA is integrated into a wider communications initiative. A staff relations unit supports this effort. It also introduced monitoring of morale and sentiment. This allows the early identification of issues, with mitigation taken as necessary. Hitherto middle managers could ignore or suppress matters that put them in a poor light. With direct communication that’s now a risky business. Everyone needs to up their game.
These direct channels reduced simmering discontent by providing an opportunity to diffuse conflict. Yet, this was not without its detractors. Some cited the system as undermining the chain of command with erosion in discipline. Others expressed concerns that the JPOA formalised the power of the police rank and file. It's certain that the JPOA became a power centre that future governments must consult.
Over time the system settled down. The JPOA proved its worth on many occasions. During the protracted, sometimes bumpy, handover negotiations, the JPOA played an active role. They proved effective in disseminating information to the frontline. In turn, the system fed information upwards. Potential flash-points soon reached the top to be then addressed or assuaged. For example, consultations with the JPOA on uniforms and insignia killed malicious rumours. These withered away to nothing.
In researching this material, I heard much about the character of Commissioner Slevin. He retired in 1979. By common consensus, his successor, Roy Henry restored morale following Slevin’s tenure.
I’d argue the events of 1977, and the later work by the Crane team had positive benefits. The Three Wise Men had an impact. While voices within the force had called for the same things, the adage “You can never be a prophet in your own land” comes to mind.
Its decided an advisory team from the UK will visit Hong Kong. They are immediately dubbed the ‘Three Wise Men’. The team led by Inspector of Constabulary, Mr J.W.D. Crane, arrives on January 17 1978. He's supported by two chief superintendents.
The team is to advise on:
- The organisation and operation of the force, with specific regard to discipline
- Staff management and morale
- Chain of command and channels of communications at all levels
- Relations with the ICAC
- Any other matters considered appropriate
Crane sought to soften the blow. He stated in public “we are here to assist the force in finding ways and means to meet their current problems.” Anyone who understands the politics will recognise that this is window dressing. Something has gone wrong, and the Crane team is in Hong Kong to find out why.
Crane's work proves harder thanks to the actions of the ICAC. With the situation volatile, sentiments are incensed on all sides. Even so, the ICAC announces an ID parade for officers detained for the Yaumati fruit market case. These officers have been on bail a year, and the timing adds fuel to the fire. Officers are not afforded the opportunity to get legal advice. Sources have suggested a repeat of 1977 was only averted by calmer heads.
Crane and his team set about their work including interviewing officers of all ranks. Then reports emerged that Slevin is receiving daily updates on who and what gets said to the team. Further, rank and file officers have interviews in the presence of their commanders. None of which is conducive to the fact-finding Crane must undertake. Of course, officers are reluctant to voice opinions fearful of retribution later. The very creditability of the process is now in doubt.
Men who wish to give evidence to the team must apply through the Commissioner. This leaks out to the media causing something of an adverse reaction. Many fear a whitewash by Crane.
Yet, the team came forward with welcome suggestions. The role of the JPOA is integrated into a wider communications initiative. A staff relations unit supports this effort. It also introduced monitoring of morale and sentiment. This allows the early identification of issues, with mitigation taken as necessary. Hitherto middle managers could ignore or suppress matters that put them in a poor light. With direct communication that’s now a risky business. Everyone needs to up their game.
These direct channels reduced simmering discontent by providing an opportunity to diffuse conflict. Yet, this was not without its detractors. Some cited the system as undermining the chain of command with erosion in discipline. Others expressed concerns that the JPOA formalised the power of the police rank and file. It's certain that the JPOA became a power centre that future governments must consult.
Over time the system settled down. The JPOA proved its worth on many occasions. During the protracted, sometimes bumpy, handover negotiations, the JPOA played an active role. They proved effective in disseminating information to the frontline. In turn, the system fed information upwards. Potential flash-points soon reached the top to be then addressed or assuaged. For example, consultations with the JPOA on uniforms and insignia killed malicious rumours. These withered away to nothing.
In researching this material, I heard much about the character of Commissioner Slevin. He retired in 1979. By common consensus, his successor, Roy Henry restored morale following Slevin’s tenure.
I’d argue the events of 1977, and the later work by the Crane team had positive benefits. The Three Wise Men had an impact. While voices within the force had called for the same things, the adage “You can never be a prophet in your own land” comes to mind.