If the Kids are United ...

"Given the historical context, the involvement of Hong Kong youth in demonstrations should be no surprise"

As the dust settles, and order returns to our fair city after the violence of 2019/20, many ask what happened? Competing narratives spring forth seeking to answer that question, each shaped by perception and partisanship. Discerning an agreed truth is problematic. What is certain is that young people, in particular students, played a leading role in the protests. 

Their involvement should be no surprise. Here, I'll frame that in a historical context. This article draws upon research undertaken by various Hong Kong parties, citing data whenever possible as this lends more substance to the conclusions. 

At the outset, I'll affirm it's impossible to tie together all the threads that played into Hong Kong's recent disorder. My earlier articles give some perspectives on other aspects and factors. For those interested, the following are relevant:

• The Truth, You Can't Handle the Truth!
• A Rebalancing 
• The Other Side of the Story
• The State of Play
  
  

Youth involvement in protest is nothing new. In truth, most social movements begin with young people questioning the established order. It's a quirk of human nature that youth always feel cynical about the older generation. 

No doubt this has an evolutionary advantage; it can produce meaningful innovation and progress. Yet, it is the young's fate to grow old and become the upcoming generation's target. Over and above that, if unrestrained, such youthful exuberance can lead to wanton disorder. 

In the modern era, the late 1960s saw growth in youth protest across Europe and the USA. The Vietnam War drove some of this, while a general disquiet at perceived unfairness in society also contributed. Academics identified distinct phases in these protests. First, idealism with marches and occupations, second radicalisation and militant actions. On occasions, this advanced onward to terrorist activity. But, in the end, most movements collapsed with infighting, disenchantment and due to state action. 

Examples of emergent terrorist activity include the 'Symbionese Liberation Army' in the US and 'Baader Meinhof' terrorist gang in Europe. These grew out of left-wing counter-culture groups. While in Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA arose from a civil rights movement. 

In China, Mao seized upon youth exuberance to unleash the Red Guards in pursuit of his aims. He soon lost control as the movement degenerated into uncontrolled violence that needed an intervention by the PLA to restore order. Nearer to home, and on a lesser scale, Benny Tai surrendered control of the 2014 ‘Occupy Central’ protests, when he couldn't constrain the younger, more militant elements.

In broad terms, ideology and identity issues drove many of these protest movements. In the 1960s Jack Weinberg, an American political activist, captured the zeitgeist when he asserted "We don't trust anyone over 30". In China, the Cultural Revolution pivoted on attacking the "Four Olds". 

Given the historical context, the involvement of Hong Kong youth in demonstrations should be no surprise. Examples include the anti-colonialism movement of the 1970s, the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and the latter-day pro-democracy events. All had a majority youth component.

It's worth remembering that participants age, move on and fade from the scene. Who remembers Christine Chan? In 2008, she was the darling of the media. Commentator Stephen Vines hailed her as Hong Kong youth's authentic voice, just before she gave an incoherent speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club. Within two years she was gone and now barely merits a footnote in Hong Kong's protest history. 

Coming up to date, you can find the genesis of the 2019 protests in the events of 2014's 'Occupy Central with love and peace'. Professor Benny Tai's brainchild, 'Occupy' aimed to push forward the pace of democracy. The movement soon slipped through his fingers if he ever indeed had much control. Young activists forced Tai to start the 'occupation' by haranguing him after midnight on 28 September 2014.

Within a matter of weeks, he retreated from the scene back to his safe office, leaving a ragtag collection of groups on the streets. Meanwhile, 'with peace and love' fell away. Violence at the Mongkok occupation site didn't bode well. Then fatigue, legal injunctions and police action saw the campaign fade away. By 3 December 2014, it was over, and the public regained the freedom to move around. 
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This was far from the end of the matter. As most protesters skulked away, a few radicals morphed into the so-called 'localists'. Their intent was an independence agenda. This element made their presence felt by staging the so-called Fishball riot at Chinese New Year 2016. 

Under the pretence of protecting hawkers in Mongkok, they ambushed police officers and went on the rampage. Not anticipating violence at a time when people traditionally avoid confrontation, the Police proved off-guard. 

The government failed to see this coming, despite a comprehensive mechanism for monitoring public sentiment. That blindness is either willful or due to incompetence. Likewise, a failure to defuse building community disquiet over Hong Kong losing its identity meant trouble was again brewing. 

In early 2019, the extradition bill proved the catalyst that ignited mayhem. What started as peaceful protests were soon hijacked by the extremists intent on widening the scope of demonstrations. As the government dithered, the Police fought the radicals on the streets. By the time Carrie Lam acted to withdraw the extradition bill, it was too late. The momentum of the protests was self-sustaining, partly aided by overseas interests keen to see Beijing put in a tight spot. 

By late 2019, a new more pro-active Commissioner of Police, saw the Force take a firmer line putting the radicals on the back foot. Meanwhile, Beijing's attitude grew more distrustful of Hong Kong. Then in mid-2020, the NSL abruptly halted the violence. Meanwhile, the emergence of Covid 19 cooled the ardour for mass gatherings, something the government leveraged to advantage. 

In seeking to comprehend these events pundits put forward claims of angry, disengaged youth, facing stalled social mobility and an identity crisis. An examination of the data from surveys tells a more nuanced story, that is perplexing and counter-intuitive. 

Here I'll cite long-term and comprehensive studies by Professor Stephen Chiu, EdUHK. This work, allied to surveys by the Youth Research Centre of the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, provides useful insights. The cohort of people surveyed range in ages from 16 to 34 years old. The key points to note are:

• 90% of young people have a sense of belonging to Hong Kong. 
• 84% cite a desire to contribute to society.
• On migration, 28.5% expressed a wish to move overseas, while 65.5% have no desire to leave Hong Kong.

Surveys found no correlation between a sense of unhappiness and joining social movements and protests. Oddly, those who expressed 'hope' for Hong Kong are more likely to join protests. 76% don't trust the government. While, over 50% claimed the government fails to listen to their voices and is poor at communication. 

From this data, we can discern that young people have a strong connection to Hong Kong and want a voice in society's direction. That's as expected. The levels of distrust of government match other age groups. For the most part, none of this is surprising. 

On social mobility and the impact it may have, the findings are intriguing. Assessing social mobility is challenging. Defining people by economic terms alone does not take account of perceptions. The numbers alone indicate that social mobility patterns haven't changed in several decades. Nor has it stalled. 

The academics divide society using the following parameters:

• Class I - earning over 33,900
• Class II - earning over 22,700 to 33,900
• Class III - earning over 16,600 to 22,700
• Class IV - earning 14,000 to 16,600

Class I and II are the middle class. 

A 2016 study found reasonable social mobility levels from Class IV to Class III/II with 78% moving upwards from their parent's category. For the Class III cohort, about 41% moved up to Class II/I. It's a more mixed picture in Class II, but most hang onto their parents' status. 

For Class I, some 41.5 % keep their parent status, while about 28% drop to Class II, 25.5% move down to Class III and 5% hit Class IV. These are the squeezed middle class.

Digging into the data, the cohort at Class I and II finds it harder to keep their relative advantage. Real wage stagnation and the fact that Hong Kong is now a mature capitalist economy, limits opportunities to advance further. Whether this factor motivated younger elements to join social movements is unclear. 

Considering individual success, a couple of factors have prominence. Having parents with a degree, and then acquiring a degree almost guarantees a young person a position in Class I/II. Plus, the advantage of a degree increases with age as the salary gap widens. 

Despite the often claimed sentiment that universities are failing or producing students with the wrong mix of skillsets, a degree still gives a profound advantage. The data is exact in this area. Even for students from Class IV, a degree offers rapid upward social mobility.

These findings are at odds with the claims from young people that their chances in life are diminishing. The mantra is that the baby boomers - the BBs - have stolen opportunities from the millenniums. Having climbed to the top, the BBs pulled up the ladder. 

This assertion is untrue. After all, the BBs provided the millenniums with far greater access to education than earlier generations. In 1996, 16.9% of teenagers went to university in Hong Kong. By 2016, that figure reached 42.7%. The BB generation funded and facilitated that improvement. 

Much of this data points to several issues that are not unique to Hong Kong. Young people feel that social mobility has stalled when the surveys suggest otherwise. This perception may come shaped by the increasing wealth gap between the very rich and the majority. Because, indeed, wealth inequality has increased. 

In simple terms, when your neighbour is poor, and you are poor, then you don't perceive you've missed out. But, when you are poor and see affluence around you, your viewpoint shifts to one of 'this is unfair'. And in Hong Kong, massive wealth lives cheek by jowl with the majority. Could this be driving the sentiment that social mobility has stalled? 

In addition, identity issues are a factor. The data points towards a fear of losing the unique Hong Kong character and the attendant legacy. As Mainland integration takes hold, an apprehension grows that existing norms will falter. This sentiment has manifested itself in clinging to aspects of the colonial era. Examples include the Queen's Pier and Wedding Card Street sagas.

These attachments, including colonial-era symbols, inevitably collide with Beijing's position to increase their concern that Hong Kong is seeking to break away. Politicians who rushed off to Washington consulting with anti-China forces fed that unease. These politicians invited Beijing to protect its interests via the NSL, prompting the very thing they feared most.

If the government is to avoid future such conflagrations, it must listen sincerely. Paying lip-service to consultations isn't going to wash. Whether process-driven administrative officers are capable of adopting the right posture remains questionable. 

Likewise, it takes two to tango. So those individuals who only seek to berate and humiliate officials don't help. 
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It is also striking that survey after survey concludes Hong Kong people support the 1C2S concept. Even those involved in the 2019 protests, including the young, exhibited a strong preference for retaining the system. 

Doubtless, threatening rebellion against the central authority is a road to ruin. The smarter upcoming politicians must position Hong Kong in that context while maintaining its unique features. If Beijing is confident that Hong Kong does not present a threat to the broader nation, then the 1C2S will survive beyond its cutoff date in 2049. Indeed, I believe that's an outcome we can all agree is desirable. 

Besides, in 2049, the youth protesting in 2019 will be approaching their late 40s.