Déjà Vu

"Boris Johnson is unfit to be the Prime Minister; the government had no Covid plan; all it had was a plan to have a plan."

"You're scaring people." was the sharp rebuke I received in 2003 from a senior police commander. During the initial stages of SARS, I'd put my officers in PPE, given that we covered the Prince of Wales Hospital, then the epicentre of the outbreak. All the medical staff wore PPE; thus, it seemed logical and prudent because a police uniform is no protection against a virus.

Unfortunately, the sense of crisis had yet to permeate Police HQ. The police public relations branch wanted answers from me because the press raised the issue. A tense exchange followed that ended with me asking, "Are you ordering me to remove the PPE, Sir? I'm prepared to do that and then record your order in my notebook."

That ended the conversation. Within days the same officer hurried to reassure the public that the police service would continue to function. 

This exchange all returned to me with a strong sense of déjà vu as I listened to Boris Johnson's former special adviser Dominic Cummings. He lamented the chaos and lack of urgency that pervaded the UK's initial response to Covid. As Cummings identified, the system or the people in it failed to switch to crisis mode. 

Let's not forget that in 2003, Hong Kong's Director of Health, Margaret Chan, initially played down SARS. She, of course, went on to head the WHO.

Scrambling to protect my staff, I faced resistance from various quarters. When I asked for extra PPE and bleach for cleaning, the clerks informed me I'd not budgeted for this and thus couldn't receive it. And, yes, they had it in their stores.

They helpfully told me to place estimates in my budget for next year, and I may get more supplies six months later. I met the same inertia as I went up the chain of command. Finally, I sat down with my regional commander, who soon understood the potential disaster that loomed. He knocked down the roadblocks. 

And yet, even with such top-cover, it took weeks to get the kit we needed. In the meantime, I did direct buying of PPE and kept the receipts hoping repayment would come. 

In a similar vein, the complaints against the police office sought (unintentionally) to sabotage our response. I'd adjusted duty schedules to have officers on two-hour stints in the Prince of Wales Hospital to minimise their exposure. A team of volunteers agreed to cover the hospital posts based on such flexibility. 

Then, a member of the public saw one volunteer in a 7/11 Shop buying a drink, which attracted a complaint about taking an unauthorised break. CCTV confirmed he'd been there less than two minutes, but CAPO considered this a 'break' that needed recording. They threatened to discipline the man. 

So here was the system going through the motions at a time of calamity, undermining morale and acting against everyone's interests. Only after an exchange of frank emails did we resolve that. 

Thus, I can comprehend Cummings's frustrations. All organisations are process-driven, reluctant to switch direction and careful to guard their domain. In Hong Kong, none of the clerical or administrative staff, who have their hands on the levers, will act unless told. This reluctance to show initiative is especially prevalent when anti-corruption measures incentivise absolute adherence to regulations. 

Cummings is in many ways an unsympathetic character. He's portrayed as a ruthless political operator with laser focus and an incredible intellect. Yet, he came across as more human than expected, apologising for his role in the Covid deaths. Except his confession looked like a ploy to weaponise his later evidence.

Also, in the week before his appearance before the committee of MP's investigating Covid, he staged a single-handed campaign that softened up Downing Street. He tweeted intent to storm their trench, and there would be casualties. This build-up soon had the vultures circling in anticipation. 

Then on the big day, with his trade-mark dishevelled 'fuck you' fashion sense, he put in a seven-hour, seven-minute scorching performance. The fusillade of shots he landed was blistering. In short, Boris Johnson is unfit to be the Prime Minister; the government had no Covid plan; all it had was a plan to have a plan. 

Strange that Cummings only recognised the unsuitability of Johnson for the job once he's given the boot. Oddly, Cummings's massive frontal cortex couldn't see that in the years he worked to get Johnson elected. 

Next came the allegations that Matt Hancock, the Minister for Health, should have been fired 15 to 20 times for lying. Wrapping it up was a civil service of 'lions led by donkeys.'  

Cummings laid out specific charges against Hancock as a serial liar, responsible for the deaths of thousands in care homes, which he failed to protect despite giving assurance of a 'ring of steel.' 

Hancock stands accused of sending thousands of vulnerable, sick, old people out of the NHS and back to care homes. This step was in anticipation of the NHS needing the beds to treat a surge of Covid patients. That surge never appeared. But many of the old folks sent away died. 

How these deaths came about is a complicated subject with conflicting sets of data. There is evidence that asymptomatic infected agency staff, moving between care homes, brought the Covid in. Only a comprehensive inquiry will establish the truth, if that's even possible.

This allegation raised the spectre of corporate manslaughter charges. That would take some doing because the hard evidence is not there at this time. 

Johnson and Hancock, supported by their MPs, fought back that Cummings is a disgruntled ex-employee with an axe to grind. That's an assertion that holds some truth, but it does not take away from aspects of the evidence he gave. 

Many of the claims that Cummings made were already known. Plus, I'd add that the initial response is always confused, disjointed, and unsettling in most crisis. That's the nature of the beast. And even with robust contingency plans, society and organisations take time to switch their mindset. 

Cummings asserts that there are many well-qualified people who could have done a better job. I'd counter that even the best-qualified get things wrong, and it's not because they are idiots or evil or corrupt. 

It's just that when making decisions without adequate facts, uncertainty prevails, and errors occur. Atop that, you can't wait for the smoke to clear to see the complete picture because it's too late.

​You have to act and be prepared to get things wrong.