Armageddon Out of Here

"...the release of secret papers from the UK Government reveals that thoughts quickly shifted to the worst-case scenario, involving a mass exodus from Hong Kong."

May 1997.

Kai Tak Airport is swamped with passengers desperate for any available flight as airlines rush to add more services. The police are enforcing a queue that stretches through Kowloon City. Fights often break out as people attempt to jump the line. The night flight curfew is lifted while the runway remains open 24/7. 

People smuggling gangs are offering safe passage for exorbitant fees that transport families to the Philippines and Taiwan. The Hong Kong British administration is on the back foot and rapidly losing control as a mass exodus is underway.

​The rich have already fled by private jet and luxury yachts to well-appointed bolt-holes. 

Thankfully, it didn’t happen. Yet in secret, the British prepared for a mass exodus scenario according to Cabinet papers released last week. Against the background of June 1989 in Beijing, Hong Kong’s confidence in the impending return to Chinese sovereignty wavered.

Over time, that confidence was restored, although in 1989 it was unclear which way we were heading.

Such a mass exodus would have a profound and far-reaching impact on both the UK and Hong Kong, prompting officials to evaluate the potential consequences. All of this makes for fascinating reading for those of us who lived through these uncertainties. 

Working covertly, a Cabinet Office Committee called MISC 140 began assessing the complex challenges that could suddenly confront Britain. By late June 1989, it had initiated its contingency planning, with a sub-committee focusing on the ‘Armageddon’ scenario of a mass exodus. 

A proposed three-phase operation began with a Green Phase (planning), an Amber Phase (a crisis seems imminent), and the Red Phase (a mass exodus has already started). 

The terms of reference were “To devise plans to deal with the contingency of a large-scale exodus from Hong Kong in the period up to July 1997 and thereafter.” 

Officials soon realised they could not predict the timing or scale of any exodus, including when and how it would start. Also, surprisingly, despite Hong Kong's years as a colony, it is evident that officials in Whitehall had only a minimal understanding of the sentiment in Hong Kong.

Relying on figures like Dame Lydia Dunn and other Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) was akin to asking the landed gentry what miners thought in the 1930s. Britain's colonial mindset meant the planners were working in the dark.

From the outset, the British aimed to leverage their experience from the 1972-73 Ugandan East African Asian crisis. That episode saw 30,000 people expelled from Uganda and arriving in the UK. Accommodation, reception arrangements, resettlement, schooling, and healthcare all needed to be provided. 

The Resettlement Board model, used during the Ugandan crisis, was to be adopted, although the scale would turn out to be much greater. The Board would oversee the reception and resettlement of all Hong Kong refugees, including matters such as language training and employment.

This work was kept so secret that only the Hong Kong Governor was informed; the Hong Kong Government was excluded from the entire process. The belief was that such planning could further undermine confidence in Hong Kong among the local population and international partners. Moreover, the Brits had no idea how China might respond. 

The UK planners considered various scenarios, ranging from quiet emigration to a sudden rush akin to the Vietnamese boat people saga. In either case, it was expected that the UK might need to accept a large number as part of its moral obligation. However, the planners soon accepted that Britain couldn’t handle any mass departure alone. 

Furthermore, the impact in the UK was expected to be significant and enduring. One paper examined the potential for a notable rise in arrivals in the UK by commercial airlines, with the UK largely unprepared for this influx. As a result, measures were introduced to improve the monitoring of people's movements. 

Various papers, briefing documents, and policy discussions explore all aspects of the different scenarios in commendable detail, with clarity about the logistics that emphasise the immense challenges likely to be faced.

Focusing solely on the aspect of transporting a large number of people, calculations showed that it would take 250 Boeing 747 Jumbo jets to move 100,000 passengers. Since Kai Tak Airport could only handle 75,000 passengers at a time, operating continuously, the scale of any airlift was immense. Furthermore, at any given moment, the airport could only accommodate 40 747s.

Neither the RAF nor the Royal Navy had enough resources to assist, except on the fringes. 

To expedite the relocation process, planners considered the possibility of shuttle flights to destinations such as the Philippines, which would operate refugee holding centres. Based on this, 50 747’s could transport 2.3 million refugees from Hong Kong to Manila within a few months.

This assumes that the necessary facilities are in place to receive, accommodate, and transfer these individuals. However, gaining the support of the host government was seen as problematic. 

Transporting 100,000 people by sea to the Philippines costs £40 million*, while doing so by air costs £21 million. Meanwhile, it is estimated that reception centres would cost £5 million to accommodate a million people. 

Another option considered was relocating people to Sydney on a temporary basis - assuming the Australians agreed. All this detail highlighted the chilling scale and complexities of such an operation. 

Even the possibility of requesting a US military airlift is mentioned, though I imagine that would not go down well in Beijing. 

The planners expected that sea evacuation could transfer 2.4 million people using 143 cruise ships, which would operate for between 14 and 28 days. They considered cruise ships shuttling back and forth to Taiwan. Why pick Taiwan is not clear. But again, the political repercussions of this option could be significant. This idea suggests ignorance on the part of the planners over the sentivities of such a move.

​Moreover, such an exercise could cost £800 million just to get to Taiwan. The UK taxpayer might have concerns about that. 

In their deliberations, the planners assumed that China would accept significant emigration from Hong Kong, although no evidence was provided to support this assumption. Elsewhere, the planners recognised that the Chinese could prevent ships from leaving Hong Kong, and under international law, had the right to challenge any vessels passing through their waters. ​

Several documents discuss the likely impact in the UK of mass arrivals. It becomes clear that the UK could not manage an influx of several million from Hong Kong without international help. Therefore, proposals for an international conference to gather support are outlined. 

A detailed analysis of the likely impact on Britain is included in the Corry Report commissioned by the South China Morning Post. The planners cite this report.

In a few instances, the benevolent face of the British officials slips: a policy paper notes that “Moves by China to stem emigration to the UK might be in our interest.”

When discussing the offer of citizenship, a recurring theme emerged: attracting the brightest and most capable from the business community to invest in Britain by giving them priority. However, this approach conflicts with the often stated goal of keeping Hong Kong a sustainable entity by anchoring local businesses. The bipolar nature of the UK's strategy was also clear in other areas. 

The British clearly aimed to limit the number of Hong Kongers allowed to land in the UK and they sought to regulate the quality of those admitted. Nonetheless, they rightly observe that well-qualified individuals had better opportunities in the US, Canada, and Australia, which are preferred destinations for many. 

And while press releases claimed that the British aimed to protect the Hong Kong citizenry, plans for extraction by sea indicated that the limited Royal Navy assets should be reserved solely for politicians and a few specially chosen individuals. 

In one revealing document, the Governor is criticised for not ensuring that British companies obtained a substantial share of the contracts for the new airport project. 

And, notably, concerns are voiced about securing the cooperation of the Hong Kong Government in managing any visa scheme for those heading to the UK. It appears that full cooperation was not taken for granted, and negotiations would be necessary. Indeed, discussions about funding the upkeep of the British military in Hong Kong suggest local politicians had cards to play and asserted their influence. 

The discussion on granting visas for residency in the UK involved extensively debated legal issues, not to mention the UK's aim to limit numbers. Then, the additional complication of the Vietnamese Boat people is introduced into the equation. 

To the sceptical eye, all this planning could be seen as an attempt by the British to extract the best talent from Hong Kong and leave behind a barren place with a depleted population.

​Therefore, it's no surprise the matter was kept secret. After all, Beijing had already expressed legitimate concerns that the new airport project might reduce Hong Kong’s reserves, leaving the treasury empty after 1997. 

In the end, the released papers offer no definitive solution; instead, what we have is some ‘blue sky thinking’ or ‘scenario planning’.  More details in future releases may shed light on how British planning progressed. 

It’s commendable that the UK sought to consider these issues, although it was blinkered by a lack of deep understanding of the mood here in Hong Kong at the time. This lack of comprehension remains an ongoing issue.

Nevertheless, it cannot be overstated that Britain was not in the driving seat here. China and the people of Hong Kong would determine any outcomes, with the British simply responding. 

Fortunately, none of these contingencies turned out to be necessary as the pragmatic outlook of the Chinese prevailed. 

(* All costings are based on 1989 prices.)