An Orgy of Deceit

"Executing captured enemy fighters in front of the media is never a good look when you wish to portray yourself as the good guys."

Max Hastings's book, 'Vietnam - An Epic History of a Tragic War' exposes an intoxicating mix of smoke and mirrors, coupled with the sheer doggedness of the North Vietnamese. His account of the war blends all the political and military narratives, telling the painful tale through the eyes of both sides.

This recent history fascinates because the bow wave of the war rocked Hong Kong for decades as refugees fled. First published in 2018, I've just completed the book that uncovers many uncomfortable facts that leave no side untouched.

Described as "His best work yet", the author pulls no punches. He is critical of both the North and South regimes, but especially the self-deception at the highest levels of the American government.

If you have the stomach for it, Hastings provides an inventory of this historic atrocity including the 12 million gallons of lethal toxins sprayed by the Americans on the Vietnamese and US troops. These dioxins disguised by the softer name ‘Agent Orange’ linger to this day, poisoning the earth and people.

We get a full account of a relentless orgy of deceit, as President Nixon lied to his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger about bombing Hanoi. Then, in turn, Kissinger lied to the Russians, the Chinese, the North and South Vietnamese. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese lied to the US and everybody they dealt with.

Much of the history is well-worn ground. Yet Hastings manages to surface rich detail exposing the falsehoods, duplicity and delusions that shaped the war. For starters, we have the distortion of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2nd and 4th August 1964, when the American public was told that North Vietnamese forces conducted sustained attacks on a US vessel. All untrue.

Then, using this embellished incident as an excuse, President Johnson committed more US forces in a marked escalation of the war.

As the story unfolds, self-interest dominates each side's actions to exclude rational assessments. President Nixon's deal to withdraw, extracting the US from the war, came driven by one factor — his 1972 reelection chances. The deaths of US troops or Vietnamese civilians had no bearing.

Much earlier, by late 1966, American experts concluded that the US was unlikely to win. Yet President Johnson and then Nixon kept adding to the pile of bodies until 1975. In the process, they drew innocent Cambodians and Laotians into their destructive game. As a consequence, both nations plunged into years of chaos.

When you strip away all the guff and get to the core of the issue, the North Vietnamese had the will to keep fighting despite losing most battles. Moreover, the vast, sophisticated US war machine had only a marginal impact on the outcome.

Secretary for Defence McNamara's use of calculations in pursuit of industrialised warfare, his kill rates, statistical models and application of 'business practices' counted for nothing against the tenacity of fighters in rubber sandals with AK47s.

Sure the Americans and their allies could defeat the enemy on the field of battle, but that's not the point. When the other side doesn't surrender, you can't pretend you've won.

McNamara, a disillusioned man, exited the stage before the final act. He resigned in 1968, going to head the World Bank, where he somewhat atoned for his sins by shifting the Bank's work towards poverty alleviation.

In the end, the North Vietnamese won the public relations battle, with the 1968 Tet offensive the pivotal moment. For months General Westmoreland and President Johnson assured the American people that victory was in sight. Then, on 30 January 1968, the Viet Cong, supported by North Vietnamese regulars, struck targets across the country during Tet.

This audacious attack struck 100 towns and cities, including provincial capitals and Saigon. Airfields, military bases, police and government buildings all came under assault.

In Hue, a month-long battle raged, while in Saigon, Viet Cong commandoes stormed parts of the US embassy compound. A US Marine captain, Mike Downs, recalls, "We didn't know where the enemy was, in which direction even." Much of this played out live on US news channels, destroying the myth that the Americans were winning.

Yet, in truth, the Tet offensive proved a military disaster for the North Vietnamese as they suffered huge losses of men and equipment. Their ability to sustain the struggle was now in doubt.

Perhaps not fully appreciated by the North at the time, they'd scored a significant victory by undermining US public support for the war. The incredible rose-tinted reports assuring the American people that the enemy was only capable of small ambushes no longer had traction.

Moreover, executing captured enemy fighters in front of the media is never a good look when you wish to portray yourself as the good guys. Although, neither side had a monopoly on atrocities.

Johnson soon announced he'd not be standing for reelection. Then Westmoreland moved on. And by 1969, Nixon was in office. Eventually, Nixon did a deal to pull out that had the South Vietnamese assume responsibility for holding the North at bay. Just one problem, the US negotiated that deal without consulting their supposed ally in South Vietnam.

Over-confident assessments claimed the South Vietnamese forces would hold out. And in fairness, several units did sterling work. Then once the North Vietnamese realised the South could no longer call on US airpower, the rout started. In no time, the triumphant North Vietnamese rolled into Saigon.

That sounds familiar — the parallels with recent events in Afghanistan are uncanny. Inflated reports of military success, secret deals and then a quick clumsy withdrawal.

That is not the only coincidence. In recent times we've seen dodgy dossiers used to manufacture consent for the war in Iraq. Joining this is Colin Powell feeding falsehoods to the world in the UN chamber. Add to that a 'them and us' attitude that takes no account of the world's complexities.

Hastings concludes the book with a quote from US Marine General Walter Eugene Boomer, "What was it all about? It bothers me we didn't learn a lot. If we had, we would not have invaded Iraq". Well, indeed. Except he should reference the leaked Pentagon Papers.

President Johnson stated that the Vietnam War aimed to secure an "independent, non-Communist South Vietnam". However, the Pentagon Papers told a different story. In a January 1965 memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, the justification was "not to help a friend, but to contain China".

The book contains many equivalent chilling episodes. But, for me, the most startling occurred in October 1972, as Kissinger stood before the South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. "The US will never sacrifice a trusted friend", he assured the South Vietnamese leader.

Two days later, back in Washington, he told staffers in the White House, "I have only one desire — to turn the Vietnamese loose on each other."

Today Vietnam is a prosperous modern place. I've visited several times, taking the compulsory tour of the Cu Chi Tunnels — a Disneyfied version of the deprivations suffered by the Viet Cong fighters.

Modern Vietnamese are upbeat and engaged with the world, while Ho Chi Minh city (the former Saigon) is glitzy. As Hastings observes, "Where the US armed forces failed with B-52s, defoliants and Spooky gunships, YouTube and Johnny Depp have proven irresistible."

And this returns us to a crucial point. If allowed to work by osmosis, culture is a powerful tool. If nothing else, the aftermath of the war taught us that.