Occupy Central - A creature void of form
"When CS was used on 28 September 2014, the follow-up sweep halted, and the crowd was not dispersed. This interruption was to have profound consequences."
The 79-day Occupy Central Movement (OCM) shaped the current political situation in Hong Kong. By consensus, the movement led to a polarised society. People adopted distinct political positions that tore through civic society and even families. You are blue or yellow. The wounds it left are tangible. Unfortunately, these wounds remain unhealed.
The movement was misunderstood and misinterpreted as a cohesive entity from the outset. Instead, it was a fragmented beast devoid of form, which was its greatness weakness. The media portrayed OCM as a movement with a distinct purpose and direction. The truth was far more complicated. The diversity of the many subgroups pursuing conflicting agendas led to its break-up. Despite attempts, the participants have since failed to rally anything equal.
OCM was a copy of the protest movements that evolved in the US, such as Occupy Wall Street. The concept of mass civil disobedience has been introduced previously; used with varying degrees of success, it is usually tied to a nonviolent approach—or at least, it starts with a nonviolent approach.
In January 2013, Associate Professor Benny Tai proposed a civil disobedience movement to pressure the government to support universal suffrage. On 27 March 2013, the Occupy Central Movement (OCM) was formally launched. Tai, the Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, and Professor Chan Kin-man are nominally the leaders. They had the backing of student groups and pro-democratic parties.
There is a common consensus that the original authors of the OCM soon lost control of the movement. Indeed, it is arguable that control was never there. Many felt this was always inevitable. The lack of cohesion in the component groups around a central figure was telling. Even the initiation of the occupation, during the early hours of 28 September 2014, was forced upon Tai. Students asserted that "he was failing to seize the moment." From that point on, Tai became peripheral. Various student groups, activists and pro-democracy organisations took the lead. Indeed, it is debatable that what started as a pro-democracy campaign morphed into a movement about wider social issues.
From the outset, critics of OCM cited history, which shows that such movements can spin out of control. Scholars of protest and public order agree that occupy movements are risky because experience has shown that segmentation erodes the foundations. Sub-groups, branches, and fractions form and then break up, leading to less and less uniformity of action.
Moreover, the protesters' belief that they have the moral high ground makes them intransigent. They close their eyes to the reality of impending failure. Plus, and this is important, over time, fatigue creeps in. Waning interest dissipates the initial heat of enthusiasm.
It is essential to understand the motivations of the current crop of protesters. In particular, the young Hong Kongers. There is considerable research in this area, including on Hong Kong youth. As with all generations, they believe that this is their moment. It is a critical time when they must act, or nothing will change. Participation is cathartic and even therapeutic as they experience a life-defining moment. They assert they have the right on their side, thus the ethical authority to act.
In this narrative, the older generation created this mess. Therefore, the elders have no authority to restrain the young. Being psychologically prepared for a struggle, they will act with the group. Nonetheless, being individualistic, they may opt to do their own thing.
These sentiments are somewhat universal in youth social movements. Scholars observed similar things in the French student uprisings of the 1960s and anti-Vietnam War protests in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. So, Hong Kong is not unique in experiencing this phenomenon.
Add to this mix the pro-democrats' belief that mass protests will force concessions from Beijing. They cite Article 23 as the key example. In their folklore, the massive protest of 1 July 2003 caused Beijing to withdraw Article 23. An estimated 500,000 people took to the streets that day. Thus, the pro-democrats supported OCM, although that support was not unequivocal.
Even before it started, a few commentators asserted that Occupy Central was already a success. They argued it got Beijing's attention. Moreover, it caused agitation amongst the business community, and the government had to prepare. The threat of OCM also shaped the debate on democracy by providing a pivot point for action. Some opinion leaders observed that all this was achieved with the slightest effort on the organisers' part.
In the latter part of 2013 and early 2014, some scholars believed that the threat of OCM was a legitimate tool. They felt it could move negotiations along. Conversely, they also asserted it should not happen. As the outcome is unknown, it could be disastrous. The recent Sunflower Revolution in Taiwan indicated how a favourable outcome was possible after 24 days. Although occasional clashes with the Police did occur, these were never serious as the protesters sought to keep matters peaceful.
One thing all the scholars agree on is that the actions of the government, in particular, the Police, have a bearing on the outcome. Police action or lack of action often dictates the pace of events. This assessment was to prove true.
Police preparations for OCM focused on dealing with large numbers of passive resistors. The Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) had some experience in this area. Yet, the proposed scale of OCM was daunting. The Police envisaged the deployment of thousands of officers for protracted periods. Besides, officers needed to train or re-train in the techniques for such a scenario.
The HKPF is unique amongst modern Police forces in that it can mobilise the whole organisation in hours. This contingency is a legacy of the colonial era. Under mobilisation protocols, officers join platoons and companies, each of which has undergone training to fight riots and deal with public disorder. These procedures served Hong Kong during unsettled times. Most notable were 1957, 1966, and 1967.
Vietnamese disturbances and events, such as the World Trade Organisation meeting in 2005, also tested the system. The Police Tactical Unit forms the backbone of the mobilisation. However, the system involves most units—the tried-and-tested logistics of mobilising work well.
Once severe disorder breaks out, the Hong Kong Police response is a textbook 'platoon attack', which is taught to all officers. In essence, you create distance between yourself and the hostile elements. Then, you proceed to advance in a controlled but determined manner. The aim is dispersal rather than arrest. CS smoke helps create the distance.
CS grenades deal with close-in hostile crowds. Then, CS projectiles are fired to keep the crowd at a distance. The option to use baton rounds is also available, although, in the past three decades, CS has proved its worth. However, once you start using CS, you must follow up until the crowd disperses.
I won't get involved in a lengthy discourse on the ethical merits or otherwise of using CS. It is nasty stuff. It immediately impacts the individual by causing them to stop what they're doing and withdraw from the area. Once disorder breaks out, CS is a lesser degree of force than a blow to the head or body with a baton. Unbiased members of the medical community, who weigh up the issues in a scientific manner, agree with that assessment.
When CS was used on 28 September 2014, the follow-up sweep halted, and the crowd was not dispersed. This interruption was to have profound consequences. Moreover, a moratorium on CS use appears to have been in place since. Again, this was to have ramifications. It changed well-established, tried and tested rules of engagement. The Police suddenly found themselves without all the options in their playbook.
A Police response alone could have blunted OCM. But what is also evident is that Police action had a direct bearing on events. At times, Police actions fed the movement by creating public sympathy. Nonetheless, later, as the Police response became more nuanced, lessons were learned and re-learned.
The Events - "No Plan Survives Contact with the Enemy"
A trial run for OCM took place after the annual 1st July rally. The march passed off without major incidents. At the end of the march, protesters sat down on Chater Road. The Police took a soft line. They tolerated the blockage until the protesters refused to go during the early morning of 2 July. A Police cordon was then secured around the crowd, arrests made, people removed, and bailed. The protesters did not resist. It was obvious that each side was weighing the other's approach.
As expected, such removal actions are time-consuming and require many Police officers. As such, quick road reopening is impossible with this method. Moreover, given that the occupiers want to be arrested, it is questionable whether detaining action is the best option. Likewise, it will likely take months before charges can be laid or heard in Court. The deterrent effect of arrest and the impact of sentencing may not occur for some time.
So, what are the alternatives for the Police? Dispersal using force is a tactical option, such as applying blunt force by batons. Lesser degrees of force, such as CS, pepper sprays, or water cannon, are all possible. These do work on a tactical level by dispersing crowds. But you lose the PR battle if the force is viewed as disproportionate.
Then, the 10th Session of the National Peoples Congress, held on 31 August 2014, set the parameters for the CE election 2017. This decision did not accord with the wishes of the OCM supporters. A line was da]rawn in the sand.
Phase 1: First Engagement.
At about 1030 pm on 26 September, students entered Civic Square outside the Central Government Offices (CGO). They occupied the square. Led by Joshua WONG, they climbed the fence. After many attempts to persuade the students to leave, on 27 September at about 0045 hrs, Police started clearing the square. A formal announcement that the gathering was illegal caused some students to leave. Others ignored the warnings, with 78 persons arrested. At about the same time, students sought to smash entry to the government offices. Police resorted to pepper spray to hold them back.
Crowds continued to gather at the CGO. Benny Tai received repeated criticism from the students, saying he had failed to act. They felt the moment had arrived for action. On 28 September, at 0130 hrs, Tai declared the start of the occupation. He did this after TV footage emerged of students haranguing him to show leadership.
Crowds gathered throughout the day as police cordon lines held against repeated charging. On the evening of 28 September, the Police cordon lines came under sustained attack by a mob armed with homemade shields and weapons. At about 6 p.m., the Police fired tear gas at the junction of Tin Mei Avenue and Harcourt Court Road. A pivotal moment arrived.
Police immediately commenced a sweeping action that saw 87 rounds of CS smoke fired. This action successfully pushed back the protesters. However, the sweep halted for reasons unknown. With 89 protesters under arrest, 41 casualties were reported, including 12 Police officers.
The use of CS boosted support for the occupiers as many perceived that the Police had overreacted to a group of peaceful students. Yet, the media ignored much of the violence used against the Police that warranted the use of CS—the Police's slowness in justifying their actions fed sentiment in favour of the protesters.
The Police had a PR battle that proved as challenging as any street action.
Phase 2: Stalemate and Posturing.
Following these opening moves, the movement settled into a protracted period of occupation. The prominent locations were the Central, Causeway Bay, and Mongkok areas. At various times, conflict with the Police arose as the occupiers sought to escalate their action. On 3 October, anti-OCM protesters confronted occupiers in Mongkok and Causeway Bay. Some violence occurred.
Mongkok was to prove particularly problematic. An intoxicating mix of triads, violent protesters and disgruntled local citizens faced off. Known triad members came out on both sides. In some ways, the occupation was a proxy for their usual disputes. A few pro-democracy politicians asserted the Police should act against the triad involvement, yet the same people never acknowledged the triads in their ranks.
From 5 October onwards, the numbers in the occupied zones started to drop. The initial euphoria of the event waned as the less dedicated protesters left. Others came and went. While the numbers were down, permanent structures appeared with orderly rows of tents. These camps were well organised, as the occupiers appointed marshals. The Police remained vigilant but passive.
On 13 October, citizens started removing barriers from Queensway. Fed up with the disruption to traffic flows and their businesses, they acted. Scuffles took place with three arrests. With no sense of irony, the students called upon the Police to enforce the law.
Phase 3: Removal and Game-over
The next day, Police moved against the obstructions on Queensway and cleared the road. At the same time, the occupied area in Causeway Bay was pushed back. These moves met with no resistance. On 15 October, footage emerged of plainclothes officers allegedly beating an arrested person. This incident followed protracted clashes on Lung Wu Road. Swift condemnation from pro-democrat groups rallied protesters to surround Police Headquarters.
The Police also moved against part of the occupied zone in Mongkok. Later that evening, the mob reoccupied the ground following protracted clashes. Trouble continued overnight in Mongkok, and Police resorted to batons to contain the situation.
Court orders sought by private groups came into effect on 20 October. At Citic Tower, the obstruction of fire exits and emergency vehicle access prompted the court orders.
On 28 October, a rally to mark the one-month anniversary of the occupation took place in Central. Both Benny Tai and CHAN Kin-man announced they are returning to their jobs. They are to leave the occupied zones. They asserted this is not a retreat, although it looks like a surrender. Further, the pro-democratic politicians in LegCo reject a proposal for a mass resignation. Their support for OCM is now lukewarm.
Then, protesters at Citic Tower removed some barriers as a gesture of goodwill. There are growing signs that the movement is fragmenting. No one appears to be able to coordinate action. In the occupied zones, endless debates ramble on.
A few clashes continue between Police and protesters in Mongkok. The students are struggling to find ideas to maintain momentum. They debate a plan to go to Beijing, but this fanciful idea collapses under the weight of its foolishness.
On 10 November, the Court affirms the injunction orders to clear various zones. Moreover, Bailiffs have the right to seek Police help if obstructed. Acting under the injunctions, bailiffs clear the area near Citic Tower. There is only token resistance.
Overnight on 18th /19th November, members of Civic Passion smash their way into the LegCo building. Mill barriers are used as battering rams, breaking through doors and windows, and doing extensive damage. Arrests are made. A live broadcast of this violence is broadcast.
Universal condemnation of these actions, including from pro-democratic politicians, is forthcoming. The moderates now seek to distance themselves from these radical actions. Public sentiment is now turning against the occupiers. The instigators are defensive as the movement's peaceful credentials are undermined.
The Police started clearing Mongkok on 25 November. A section along Argyle Street opened with little resistance. The next day, the Nathan Road section was cleared after 107 arrests. By lunchtime, Nathan Road was open to traffic.
Every night until 29 November, attempts are made to reoccupy the Mongkok zone. Clashes between Police and protesters occur. Police use batons and pepper spray to contain the situation. The protesters adopt wildcat tactics. They block a section of the road and then retreat. As traffic holds up becomes worse, public support for the occupiers further erodes.
On 30 November, the students call their supporters to Central. The final battle is about to occur. The plan is to surround CGO. Armed with homemade shields, the protesters charge the Police lines. Batons and pepper spray drive them back as a series of running skirmishes develop on Lung Wo Road. Early in the morning, swift action by Police clears the remaining protesters to reopen the road. Arrests result, and a number on each side are injured. A last futile attempt to rush CGO is met with fire hoses. The students admit defeat. They make a crestfallen retreat.
The movement has lost public support and spun out of control. Some voice fears that continued action will only lead to more violence. By 1 December, pro-democratic politicians are calling for calm. They scramble to distance themselves from the violence. Meanwhile, Joshua WONG goes on a faux hunger strike. Benny Tai emerges to call for withdrawal as he fears further violence.
Finally, between 11th and 15th December, all the occupied zones were cleared. The Police moved in to remove the barricades without resistance. In Central, pro-democrat politicians conducted a sit-in, a symbolic and inane action. Arrested for obstruction, they got face-time in the media.
The students announce a moratorium on further actions. Citing fatigue, they need to consider what comes next. Some openly acknowledge that they have lost public support. Various ideas are banded around, including delays in paying government rent and taxes. Derided as futile gestures and wishful thinking, the lack of public support is telling.
Some Observations and Comments.
OCM's trajectory followed that of other Occupy movements. It started strong, gained a lot of publicity, rumbled along, fragmented, and waned, and then died without much resistance. Moreover, if its principal aim was to sway Beijing, it failed.
The movement was bound to fail. No single strong leader emerged who could carry the whole movement. The nominal leader, Benny TAI, didn't stay the course. The movement's ethos of consensus and consultation was the seed of its defeat because everyone wanted a voice and to be in charge.
The majority of the initial participants had no stamina for the long haul. Derided by some as strawberries, soft and easy to bruise, they soon withdrew. Ultimately, the radicals took over with violence, undermining public support.
Overall, the Police remained stoic in the face of repeated provocations. The vast majority remained professional in the face of extreme goading, working long hours under trying circumstances. Nonetheless, the damage done to the Police's image is significant. On the one hand, they were accused of being too heavyhanded, and on the other, derided for failing to enforce the law. They could please neither side.
On a more positive note, the Police learnt to change and adjust their approach. Whilst the initial use of CS was well justified on operational grounds, it was a PR failure. Later, Police action displayed more finesse. Although, the reliance on close-quarter methods may have resulted in more injuries. Making officers get close to a hostile crowd creates the potential for severe injuries. Also, control can be more challenging; with tempers flaring, officers and protesters are tempted to lash out.
Yet, on a tactical level, the Police could pick off the various occupied zones as and when they liked. As such, they had the final advantage.
Both the Hong Kong Government and Beijing opted to play a waiting game. This approach left the Police with law and order issues and a clear directive not to inflame the situation. So, they waited for the movement to self-destruct. It's a strategy that worked.
The occupiers will argue that the movement succeeded as it drew international attention to Hong Kong. It also politicised a new generation while encouraging public debate. However, it is also arguable that the movement set back reforms because it made Beijing less trusting of Hong Kong.
The jury may still be out on the long-term consequences of OCM. The debate will no doubt continue for years to come. What is certain is Beijing did not blink in the face of the movement. The Chief Executive, CY Leung, remained steadfast, and the Police gave him a win. More fundamentally, the movement polarised Hong Kong society with deep scars that are unlikely to heal soon.
Still, picking a winner is unwise and unjustified, but Beijing gained the upper hand. OCM dissipated without bloodshed. The international media soon left town when they realised this would not be another Tiananmen.
In the final reckoning, the Police proved resolute. Yes, they learned and re-learned lessons, but a new generation of officers gained experience. On the other hand, Benny Tai and his partners proved to have feet of clay.
Joshua Wong continues to garner international attention as the face of the protests, even though he admits that OCM fell flat. In the current climate, it is doubtful that he can galvanise future mass actions.
The one tangible product of OCM is the extremist independence movement. This loosely knit group unwisely seeks to challenge China's sovereignty over Hong Kong. These people are the delusional remains of Occupy, clinging to a non-starter agenda. They need to be watched.
As foreseen, OCM was a high-risk strategy that had unforeseen consequences. And so it proved.
4 December 2016
The movement was misunderstood and misinterpreted as a cohesive entity from the outset. Instead, it was a fragmented beast devoid of form, which was its greatness weakness. The media portrayed OCM as a movement with a distinct purpose and direction. The truth was far more complicated. The diversity of the many subgroups pursuing conflicting agendas led to its break-up. Despite attempts, the participants have since failed to rally anything equal.
OCM was a copy of the protest movements that evolved in the US, such as Occupy Wall Street. The concept of mass civil disobedience has been introduced previously; used with varying degrees of success, it is usually tied to a nonviolent approach—or at least, it starts with a nonviolent approach.
In January 2013, Associate Professor Benny Tai proposed a civil disobedience movement to pressure the government to support universal suffrage. On 27 March 2013, the Occupy Central Movement (OCM) was formally launched. Tai, the Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, and Professor Chan Kin-man are nominally the leaders. They had the backing of student groups and pro-democratic parties.
There is a common consensus that the original authors of the OCM soon lost control of the movement. Indeed, it is arguable that control was never there. Many felt this was always inevitable. The lack of cohesion in the component groups around a central figure was telling. Even the initiation of the occupation, during the early hours of 28 September 2014, was forced upon Tai. Students asserted that "he was failing to seize the moment." From that point on, Tai became peripheral. Various student groups, activists and pro-democracy organisations took the lead. Indeed, it is debatable that what started as a pro-democracy campaign morphed into a movement about wider social issues.
From the outset, critics of OCM cited history, which shows that such movements can spin out of control. Scholars of protest and public order agree that occupy movements are risky because experience has shown that segmentation erodes the foundations. Sub-groups, branches, and fractions form and then break up, leading to less and less uniformity of action.
Moreover, the protesters' belief that they have the moral high ground makes them intransigent. They close their eyes to the reality of impending failure. Plus, and this is important, over time, fatigue creeps in. Waning interest dissipates the initial heat of enthusiasm.
It is essential to understand the motivations of the current crop of protesters. In particular, the young Hong Kongers. There is considerable research in this area, including on Hong Kong youth. As with all generations, they believe that this is their moment. It is a critical time when they must act, or nothing will change. Participation is cathartic and even therapeutic as they experience a life-defining moment. They assert they have the right on their side, thus the ethical authority to act.
In this narrative, the older generation created this mess. Therefore, the elders have no authority to restrain the young. Being psychologically prepared for a struggle, they will act with the group. Nonetheless, being individualistic, they may opt to do their own thing.
These sentiments are somewhat universal in youth social movements. Scholars observed similar things in the French student uprisings of the 1960s and anti-Vietnam War protests in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. So, Hong Kong is not unique in experiencing this phenomenon.
Add to this mix the pro-democrats' belief that mass protests will force concessions from Beijing. They cite Article 23 as the key example. In their folklore, the massive protest of 1 July 2003 caused Beijing to withdraw Article 23. An estimated 500,000 people took to the streets that day. Thus, the pro-democrats supported OCM, although that support was not unequivocal.
Even before it started, a few commentators asserted that Occupy Central was already a success. They argued it got Beijing's attention. Moreover, it caused agitation amongst the business community, and the government had to prepare. The threat of OCM also shaped the debate on democracy by providing a pivot point for action. Some opinion leaders observed that all this was achieved with the slightest effort on the organisers' part.
In the latter part of 2013 and early 2014, some scholars believed that the threat of OCM was a legitimate tool. They felt it could move negotiations along. Conversely, they also asserted it should not happen. As the outcome is unknown, it could be disastrous. The recent Sunflower Revolution in Taiwan indicated how a favourable outcome was possible after 24 days. Although occasional clashes with the Police did occur, these were never serious as the protesters sought to keep matters peaceful.
One thing all the scholars agree on is that the actions of the government, in particular, the Police, have a bearing on the outcome. Police action or lack of action often dictates the pace of events. This assessment was to prove true.
Police preparations for OCM focused on dealing with large numbers of passive resistors. The Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) had some experience in this area. Yet, the proposed scale of OCM was daunting. The Police envisaged the deployment of thousands of officers for protracted periods. Besides, officers needed to train or re-train in the techniques for such a scenario.
The HKPF is unique amongst modern Police forces in that it can mobilise the whole organisation in hours. This contingency is a legacy of the colonial era. Under mobilisation protocols, officers join platoons and companies, each of which has undergone training to fight riots and deal with public disorder. These procedures served Hong Kong during unsettled times. Most notable were 1957, 1966, and 1967.
Vietnamese disturbances and events, such as the World Trade Organisation meeting in 2005, also tested the system. The Police Tactical Unit forms the backbone of the mobilisation. However, the system involves most units—the tried-and-tested logistics of mobilising work well.
Once severe disorder breaks out, the Hong Kong Police response is a textbook 'platoon attack', which is taught to all officers. In essence, you create distance between yourself and the hostile elements. Then, you proceed to advance in a controlled but determined manner. The aim is dispersal rather than arrest. CS smoke helps create the distance.
CS grenades deal with close-in hostile crowds. Then, CS projectiles are fired to keep the crowd at a distance. The option to use baton rounds is also available, although, in the past three decades, CS has proved its worth. However, once you start using CS, you must follow up until the crowd disperses.
I won't get involved in a lengthy discourse on the ethical merits or otherwise of using CS. It is nasty stuff. It immediately impacts the individual by causing them to stop what they're doing and withdraw from the area. Once disorder breaks out, CS is a lesser degree of force than a blow to the head or body with a baton. Unbiased members of the medical community, who weigh up the issues in a scientific manner, agree with that assessment.
When CS was used on 28 September 2014, the follow-up sweep halted, and the crowd was not dispersed. This interruption was to have profound consequences. Moreover, a moratorium on CS use appears to have been in place since. Again, this was to have ramifications. It changed well-established, tried and tested rules of engagement. The Police suddenly found themselves without all the options in their playbook.
A Police response alone could have blunted OCM. But what is also evident is that Police action had a direct bearing on events. At times, Police actions fed the movement by creating public sympathy. Nonetheless, later, as the Police response became more nuanced, lessons were learned and re-learned.
The Events - "No Plan Survives Contact with the Enemy"
A trial run for OCM took place after the annual 1st July rally. The march passed off without major incidents. At the end of the march, protesters sat down on Chater Road. The Police took a soft line. They tolerated the blockage until the protesters refused to go during the early morning of 2 July. A Police cordon was then secured around the crowd, arrests made, people removed, and bailed. The protesters did not resist. It was obvious that each side was weighing the other's approach.
As expected, such removal actions are time-consuming and require many Police officers. As such, quick road reopening is impossible with this method. Moreover, given that the occupiers want to be arrested, it is questionable whether detaining action is the best option. Likewise, it will likely take months before charges can be laid or heard in Court. The deterrent effect of arrest and the impact of sentencing may not occur for some time.
So, what are the alternatives for the Police? Dispersal using force is a tactical option, such as applying blunt force by batons. Lesser degrees of force, such as CS, pepper sprays, or water cannon, are all possible. These do work on a tactical level by dispersing crowds. But you lose the PR battle if the force is viewed as disproportionate.
Then, the 10th Session of the National Peoples Congress, held on 31 August 2014, set the parameters for the CE election 2017. This decision did not accord with the wishes of the OCM supporters. A line was da]rawn in the sand.
Phase 1: First Engagement.
At about 1030 pm on 26 September, students entered Civic Square outside the Central Government Offices (CGO). They occupied the square. Led by Joshua WONG, they climbed the fence. After many attempts to persuade the students to leave, on 27 September at about 0045 hrs, Police started clearing the square. A formal announcement that the gathering was illegal caused some students to leave. Others ignored the warnings, with 78 persons arrested. At about the same time, students sought to smash entry to the government offices. Police resorted to pepper spray to hold them back.
Crowds continued to gather at the CGO. Benny Tai received repeated criticism from the students, saying he had failed to act. They felt the moment had arrived for action. On 28 September, at 0130 hrs, Tai declared the start of the occupation. He did this after TV footage emerged of students haranguing him to show leadership.
Crowds gathered throughout the day as police cordon lines held against repeated charging. On the evening of 28 September, the Police cordon lines came under sustained attack by a mob armed with homemade shields and weapons. At about 6 p.m., the Police fired tear gas at the junction of Tin Mei Avenue and Harcourt Court Road. A pivotal moment arrived.
Police immediately commenced a sweeping action that saw 87 rounds of CS smoke fired. This action successfully pushed back the protesters. However, the sweep halted for reasons unknown. With 89 protesters under arrest, 41 casualties were reported, including 12 Police officers.
The use of CS boosted support for the occupiers as many perceived that the Police had overreacted to a group of peaceful students. Yet, the media ignored much of the violence used against the Police that warranted the use of CS—the Police's slowness in justifying their actions fed sentiment in favour of the protesters.
The Police had a PR battle that proved as challenging as any street action.
Phase 2: Stalemate and Posturing.
Following these opening moves, the movement settled into a protracted period of occupation. The prominent locations were the Central, Causeway Bay, and Mongkok areas. At various times, conflict with the Police arose as the occupiers sought to escalate their action. On 3 October, anti-OCM protesters confronted occupiers in Mongkok and Causeway Bay. Some violence occurred.
Mongkok was to prove particularly problematic. An intoxicating mix of triads, violent protesters and disgruntled local citizens faced off. Known triad members came out on both sides. In some ways, the occupation was a proxy for their usual disputes. A few pro-democracy politicians asserted the Police should act against the triad involvement, yet the same people never acknowledged the triads in their ranks.
From 5 October onwards, the numbers in the occupied zones started to drop. The initial euphoria of the event waned as the less dedicated protesters left. Others came and went. While the numbers were down, permanent structures appeared with orderly rows of tents. These camps were well organised, as the occupiers appointed marshals. The Police remained vigilant but passive.
On 13 October, citizens started removing barriers from Queensway. Fed up with the disruption to traffic flows and their businesses, they acted. Scuffles took place with three arrests. With no sense of irony, the students called upon the Police to enforce the law.
Phase 3: Removal and Game-over
The next day, Police moved against the obstructions on Queensway and cleared the road. At the same time, the occupied area in Causeway Bay was pushed back. These moves met with no resistance. On 15 October, footage emerged of plainclothes officers allegedly beating an arrested person. This incident followed protracted clashes on Lung Wu Road. Swift condemnation from pro-democrat groups rallied protesters to surround Police Headquarters.
The Police also moved against part of the occupied zone in Mongkok. Later that evening, the mob reoccupied the ground following protracted clashes. Trouble continued overnight in Mongkok, and Police resorted to batons to contain the situation.
Court orders sought by private groups came into effect on 20 October. At Citic Tower, the obstruction of fire exits and emergency vehicle access prompted the court orders.
On 28 October, a rally to mark the one-month anniversary of the occupation took place in Central. Both Benny Tai and CHAN Kin-man announced they are returning to their jobs. They are to leave the occupied zones. They asserted this is not a retreat, although it looks like a surrender. Further, the pro-democratic politicians in LegCo reject a proposal for a mass resignation. Their support for OCM is now lukewarm.
Then, protesters at Citic Tower removed some barriers as a gesture of goodwill. There are growing signs that the movement is fragmenting. No one appears to be able to coordinate action. In the occupied zones, endless debates ramble on.
A few clashes continue between Police and protesters in Mongkok. The students are struggling to find ideas to maintain momentum. They debate a plan to go to Beijing, but this fanciful idea collapses under the weight of its foolishness.
On 10 November, the Court affirms the injunction orders to clear various zones. Moreover, Bailiffs have the right to seek Police help if obstructed. Acting under the injunctions, bailiffs clear the area near Citic Tower. There is only token resistance.
Overnight on 18th /19th November, members of Civic Passion smash their way into the LegCo building. Mill barriers are used as battering rams, breaking through doors and windows, and doing extensive damage. Arrests are made. A live broadcast of this violence is broadcast.
Universal condemnation of these actions, including from pro-democratic politicians, is forthcoming. The moderates now seek to distance themselves from these radical actions. Public sentiment is now turning against the occupiers. The instigators are defensive as the movement's peaceful credentials are undermined.
The Police started clearing Mongkok on 25 November. A section along Argyle Street opened with little resistance. The next day, the Nathan Road section was cleared after 107 arrests. By lunchtime, Nathan Road was open to traffic.
Every night until 29 November, attempts are made to reoccupy the Mongkok zone. Clashes between Police and protesters occur. Police use batons and pepper spray to contain the situation. The protesters adopt wildcat tactics. They block a section of the road and then retreat. As traffic holds up becomes worse, public support for the occupiers further erodes.
On 30 November, the students call their supporters to Central. The final battle is about to occur. The plan is to surround CGO. Armed with homemade shields, the protesters charge the Police lines. Batons and pepper spray drive them back as a series of running skirmishes develop on Lung Wo Road. Early in the morning, swift action by Police clears the remaining protesters to reopen the road. Arrests result, and a number on each side are injured. A last futile attempt to rush CGO is met with fire hoses. The students admit defeat. They make a crestfallen retreat.
The movement has lost public support and spun out of control. Some voice fears that continued action will only lead to more violence. By 1 December, pro-democratic politicians are calling for calm. They scramble to distance themselves from the violence. Meanwhile, Joshua WONG goes on a faux hunger strike. Benny Tai emerges to call for withdrawal as he fears further violence.
Finally, between 11th and 15th December, all the occupied zones were cleared. The Police moved in to remove the barricades without resistance. In Central, pro-democrat politicians conducted a sit-in, a symbolic and inane action. Arrested for obstruction, they got face-time in the media.
The students announce a moratorium on further actions. Citing fatigue, they need to consider what comes next. Some openly acknowledge that they have lost public support. Various ideas are banded around, including delays in paying government rent and taxes. Derided as futile gestures and wishful thinking, the lack of public support is telling.
Some Observations and Comments.
OCM's trajectory followed that of other Occupy movements. It started strong, gained a lot of publicity, rumbled along, fragmented, and waned, and then died without much resistance. Moreover, if its principal aim was to sway Beijing, it failed.
The movement was bound to fail. No single strong leader emerged who could carry the whole movement. The nominal leader, Benny TAI, didn't stay the course. The movement's ethos of consensus and consultation was the seed of its defeat because everyone wanted a voice and to be in charge.
The majority of the initial participants had no stamina for the long haul. Derided by some as strawberries, soft and easy to bruise, they soon withdrew. Ultimately, the radicals took over with violence, undermining public support.
Overall, the Police remained stoic in the face of repeated provocations. The vast majority remained professional in the face of extreme goading, working long hours under trying circumstances. Nonetheless, the damage done to the Police's image is significant. On the one hand, they were accused of being too heavyhanded, and on the other, derided for failing to enforce the law. They could please neither side.
On a more positive note, the Police learnt to change and adjust their approach. Whilst the initial use of CS was well justified on operational grounds, it was a PR failure. Later, Police action displayed more finesse. Although, the reliance on close-quarter methods may have resulted in more injuries. Making officers get close to a hostile crowd creates the potential for severe injuries. Also, control can be more challenging; with tempers flaring, officers and protesters are tempted to lash out.
Yet, on a tactical level, the Police could pick off the various occupied zones as and when they liked. As such, they had the final advantage.
Both the Hong Kong Government and Beijing opted to play a waiting game. This approach left the Police with law and order issues and a clear directive not to inflame the situation. So, they waited for the movement to self-destruct. It's a strategy that worked.
The occupiers will argue that the movement succeeded as it drew international attention to Hong Kong. It also politicised a new generation while encouraging public debate. However, it is also arguable that the movement set back reforms because it made Beijing less trusting of Hong Kong.
The jury may still be out on the long-term consequences of OCM. The debate will no doubt continue for years to come. What is certain is Beijing did not blink in the face of the movement. The Chief Executive, CY Leung, remained steadfast, and the Police gave him a win. More fundamentally, the movement polarised Hong Kong society with deep scars that are unlikely to heal soon.
Still, picking a winner is unwise and unjustified, but Beijing gained the upper hand. OCM dissipated without bloodshed. The international media soon left town when they realised this would not be another Tiananmen.
In the final reckoning, the Police proved resolute. Yes, they learned and re-learned lessons, but a new generation of officers gained experience. On the other hand, Benny Tai and his partners proved to have feet of clay.
Joshua Wong continues to garner international attention as the face of the protests, even though he admits that OCM fell flat. In the current climate, it is doubtful that he can galvanise future mass actions.
The one tangible product of OCM is the extremist independence movement. This loosely knit group unwisely seeks to challenge China's sovereignty over Hong Kong. These people are the delusional remains of Occupy, clinging to a non-starter agenda. They need to be watched.
As foreseen, OCM was a high-risk strategy that had unforeseen consequences. And so it proved.
4 December 2016
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